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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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SUBJECT: DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-22: CONSEQUENCES OF
CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT
TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the consequences of certain possible US
courses of action with respect to an identifiable Chinese
Communist military intervention in Indochina, Burma, or
Thailand.

SCOPE

The questions presented below, which further define the
problem, fall into two categories: (1) those related to a
possible US course of action in present circumstances, prior
to any open Chinese Communist military intervention in South-
east Asia, for the purpose of deterring such aggression;
(2) those related to the situation after such a Chinese
Communist military intervention had patently occurred. The

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response should be in broad terms and should deal with basic reactions, without wargaming the operations envisaged.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. PRIOR TO ANY IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION* IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

A. What is the likelihood that the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand would agree in advance to join with the United States in taking military counteraction against Communist China in the event of an identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?

1. Assuming that this military counteraction were limited to repelling the aggression in the area where it occurred?

2. Assuming that the counteraction were to include attacks on targets in Communist China directly related to Chinese Communist operations in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?

* The term "identifiable Chinese Communist military intervention" is intended to cover either an open and acknowledged military intervention or an unacknowledged military intervention of such a scale and nature that its existence could be demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt.

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3. Assuming that the counteraction were to include retaliatory operations with conventional weapons against Communist China in general?
 4. Assuming that the military counteraction envisaged were to include the use of atomic weapons?
- B. How would a joint warning by the five powers that they would take joint military counteraction in the circumstances envisaged affect Chinese Communist intentions? -- Soviet intentions? -- Sino-Soviet relations?
1. If the scope of the intended counteraction were not specified?
 2. If it were made clear that the intended counteraction would include retaliatory operations against Communist China itself?
 3. If the use of atomic weapons were threatened?
 4. If the warning were made publicly, or if it were given secretly through diplomatic channels?

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- C. Would the participation of Asiatic governments (particularly Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, or India) in the joint warning be of any value? What is the likelihood that any such government would participate?
- D. What would be the effect of such a joint warning by the five powers:
1. On the peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand?
 2. On other peoples and governments of East and South Asia?
 3. On non-participating NATO countries?
 4. Elsewhere (if any important effect is foreseen)?

II. IN THE ACTUAL EVENT OF IDENTIFIABLE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA, BURMA, OR THAILAND:

- A. Could the United Nations be led to declare Communist China the aggressor and to sanction:
1. Military counteraction to repel the aggression?
 2. Retaliatory military action against Communist China in general?

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- B. What additional moral and material support could the five powers expect to receive as a result of such UN sanction? What additional moral and material support might they receive even if the United Nations failed to take prompt and effective action?
- C. What would be the Chinese Communist reaction to the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China? -- the Soviet reaction? -- the effect on Sino-Soviet relations?
- D. What would be the psychological and political effect within Communist China of the actual execution of retaliatory joint military counteraction against Communist China itself:
1. If such counteraction were limited to naval blockades and the conventional bombing of selective targets?
 2. If such counteraction included a general air offensive including the use of atomic weapons?

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E. How would the peoples and governments of Indochina, Burma, and Thailand react to the actual execution of joint military counteraction against the Chinese Communist military intervention:

1. If such counteraction were limited to efforts to repel the aggression in Indochina, Burma, or Thailand?
2. If such counteraction included naval blockade and the conventional bombing of selective targets in Communist China?
3. If such counteraction included a general air offensive against Communist China including the use of atomic weapons?

F. How would other peoples and governments in East and South Asia react to the actual execution of joint military counteraction against Communist China in each of the three cases indicated above?

G. Would there be any important reactions elsewhere?

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- H. How would the powers engaged in this joint military action then regard the active employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- I. What would be the reaction of the mainland Chinese to the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- J. How would other peoples and governments of East and South Asia then regard the employment of Chinese Nationalist forces against the Chinese Communists?
- K. What would be the effect upon the situation if the United States, having failed to obtain the prior agreement of the four powers named in I A, or effective action by the United Nations, should take unilateral military action against China proper in the circumstances envisaged?
- L. What would be the consequences, in the circumstances envisaged, if no effective military counteraction were taken against China proper?